Tuesday, April 8, 2008

ARTICLE 121(1A) FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Sejauhmanakah Artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan menyelesaikan konflik bidangkuasa di antara mahkamah sivil dan mahkamah syariah?



Artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia memainkan peranan yang penting dalam membezakan kedudukan antara mahkamah sivil dan syariah dari segi bidangkuasa. Pindaan artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang mana mula berkuatkuasa pada 10hb Jun 1988 telah menyelesaikan konflik yang wujud berkenaan keputusan mahkamah syariah dan sivil; dalam hal perkara yang melibatkan bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah ( rujuk jadual 9, senarai 2 butiran 1 ) hanya boleh diputuskan oleh mahkamah syariah. Sekiranya hal perkara bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah di bawa ke hadapan mahkamah sivil maka adalah menjadi tanggungjawab mahkamah sivil untuk menolak perbicaraan kes yang dihadapkan kepadanya.

Persoalannya kini, adakah dengan pindaan artikel 121(1A), mahkamah syariah mempunyai kuasa mutlak berhubung dengan undang-undang islam? Dengan kata lain adakah pindaan artikel 121(1A) berjaya mengatasi konflik bidangkuasa/percanggahan keputusan hakim di antara mahkamah sivil dan syariah.

Adalah sesuatu yang membanggakan apabila kewujudan dan kewibawaan mahkamah syariah sebagai teras keadilan sejagat/universal diiktiraf oleh Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia sendiri sepertimana artikel 3(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan memartabatkan Islam sebagai agama rasmi persekutuan disamping jaminan akan hak kebebasan beragama bagi rakyat yang bukan beragama islam menerusi artikel 11 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dengan batas-batas yang ditentukan oleh undang-undang tertinggi negara Malaysia.

Tanggal 10hb Jun 1988 kuasa mutlak bagi bangkitan kes-kes yang melibatkan undang-undang islam dan orang-orang islam beralih sepenuhnya kepada bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah merangkumi kuasa budi bicara, mendengar dan memutus bagi hal perkara yang dipertikaikan. Ini bererti mahkamah sivil tidak boleh membicarakan sesuatu kes yang terletak di bawah bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah, sedangkan sebelum pindaan artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan/10hb Jun 1988 kedua-dua mahkamah sivil dan syariah mempunyai bidangkuasa yang selari dalam aspek-aspek perbicaraan yang melibatkan undang-undang Islam serta apabila wujud percanggahan maka keputusan mahkamah sivil mengatasi mahkamah syariah dan diputuskan sebagai muktamad/terikat.

Kenyataan ini dapat dibuktikan melalui kajian kes-kes sebelum tahun 1988 iaitu sebelum pindaan artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang jelas mencermin akan kepincangan sistem undang-undang malaysia yang berkonflik antara mahkamah sivil dan syariah dalam bidangkuasa masing-masing.

Menurut kes Myriam v Arif; mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa hak penjagaan anak daripada keluarga Islam boleh diputuskan mengikut akta penjagaan kanak-kanak 1966 dan perintah berkaitan dengan akta tersebut boleh dibuat oleh mahkamah sivil.Keputusan ini adalah bertentangan dengan bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah untuk membicarakan kes-kes yang melibatkan penjagaan anak orang Islam. Hakim Abdul Hamid semasa penghakimannya telah memutuskan bahawa perintah yang dibuat oleh Kadhi di mahkamah syariah untuk memberikan hak penjagaan anak (hadanah) kepada si bapa tidak menghalang si ibu untuk membuat permohonan penjagaan anak di mahkamah tinggi. Rujukan telah dibuat kepada seksyen 245(b) enakmen pentadbiran undang-undang Islam 1952 yang memperuntukkan “ tiada apa-apa yang tedapat dalam enakmen ini akan menganggu bidangkuasa mahkamah sivil dan apabila terdapat perbezaaan atau percanggahan antara keputusan mahkamah syariah/seorang kadhi dengan mahkamah sivil yang bertindak dalam ruang lingkup bidangkuasanya, maka keputusan mahkamah sivil adalah mengatasi.

Dalam kes Ainan v Syed Abu Bakar; mahkamah tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa seorang anak muslim yang dilahirkan kurang 4 bulan selepas perkahwinan dengan seorang lelaki adalah dianggap sebagai sah taraf. Merujuk kepada seksyen 112 Enakmen Keterangan yang mana keputusan ini bertentangan dengan prinsip Islam iaitu anak yang lahir dalam tempoh masa yang kurang daripada 9 bulan selepas perkahwinan adalah anak luar nikah. Menurut penghakiman enakmen keterangan adalah statut umum dan semua penduduk persekutuan Malaysia adalah tertakluk dan terikat kepada peruntukkan ini tanpa mengira ras dan agama.

Nafsiah v Abdul Majid; plantif yang mengambil tindakan guaman bagi mendapatkan gantirugi atas kemungkiran janji untuk berkahwin dan telah terlanjur dalam hubungannya serta melahirkan seorang anak. Kes ini apabila dibicarakan di hadapan mahkamah kadi besar mengikut seksyen 149 enakmen pentadbiran undang-undang Islam Melaka 1959 telah menolak tuntutan gantirugi yang dikemukakan oleh plantif disebabkan oleh pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam kes ini adalah beragama Islam dan janji untuk berkahwin hanyalah bersifat harus dan bukanlah wajib. Apabila plantif gagal dalam tuntutan mengikut undang-undang Islam maka tuntutan difailkan ke mahkamah tinggi. Hakim Sharma telah memutuskan bahawa mahkamah tinggi mempunyai bidangkuasa mendengar dan membicarakan kes ini memandangkan tidak terdapat apa-apa peruntukan dalam enakmen pentadbiran undang-undang Islam Melaka 1959 bahawa kadi besar mempunyai bidangkuasa eksklusif dalam semua hal berhubung dengan perkara-perkara yang timbul daripada perkahwinan dikalangan orang-orang Islam. Oleh itu, tuntutan plaintif berjaya dan gantirugi sebanyak RM 1,200.00 diberikan. Malah akta mahkamah kehakiman 1964 dengan nyata memberikan bidangkuasa kepada mahkamah tinggi untuk membicarakan kes ini. Selain seksyen 109 ordinan mahkamah 1948 yang tidak dimansuhkan oleh akta mahkamah kehakiman jelas memperuntukkan “ jika terdapat apa-apa perselisihan atau ketidakseimbangan antara peruntukan-peruntukan ordinan mahkamah 1948 dengan peruntukan mana-mana undang-undang bertulis pada tarikh berkuatkuasa ordinan mahkamah 1948, peruntukan ordinan hendaklah terpakai dan mengatasi peruntukan-peruntukan lain.

Penghakiman dalam kes Roberts v Umi Kalthom iaitu harta sepencarian adalah perkara yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang adat dan bukan bidangkuasa undang-undang Islam. Keputusan kes ini diikuti dalam kes Boto’ Bt Taha v Jaafar Bin Muhammad; harta sepencarian bukan bersandar kepada hukum Islam akan tetapi bersandar kepada adat melayu yang diamalkan oleh masyarakat melayu. Meskipun, keputusan ini diiktiraf melalui prinsip maxim perundangan Islam iaitu “adat mengambil tempat hukum” dengan syarat tiadak bercanggah dengan syarak. Walaubagaimanapun usaha tidak dibuat oleh mahkamah sivil untuk mancari asas kebenaran harta sepencarian itu yang terdapat dalam undang-undang Islam. Sebaliknya usaha seperti ini telah dibuat oleh mahkamah syariah.

Setelah pindaan artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia kuasa mahkamah syariah lebih jelas tanpa campurtangan mahkamah tinggi. Kesan pindaan ini telah diperkukuhkan lagi melalui keptusan-keputusan mahkamah agung dalam kes Mohd. Habibullah Bin Mahmood v Faridah Bt Dato’ Talib; pada 15 Disember 1992 telah memutuskan bahawa seorang isteri yang beragama Islam tidak boleh membawa tuntutan ke mahkamah sivil untuk mendapat gantirugi dan injunksi (tegahan) terhadap suaminya yang didakwanya melakukan serang sentuh dan gangguan terhadap dirinya. Bahkan permohonan tersebut hanya boleh di pohon di mahkamah syariah memandangkan ia tertakluk kepada bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah.

Walaubagaimanapun peruntukan 121 (1A) ini belum cukup untuk mengatasi pertindihan kuasa antara kedua-dua mahkamah secara sepenuhnya. Ini kerana masih terdapat lagi ruang yang membolehkan mahkamah sivil untuk membicarakan perkara-perkara yang tertakluk di bawah mahkamah bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah. Umpamanya kes Sukma Darmawan Susmadjataat v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & SL; yang mana hakim memutuskan bahawa mahkamah sivil mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk membicarakan perayu yang dituduh melakukan seks luar tabii (liwat) di bawah kanun keseksaan walaupun terdapat akta jenayah syariah yang memperuntukkan hukuman bagi kesalahan yang sama.

Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi Besar Pasir Mas; kes yang melibatkan pertikaian tentang hak penjagaan anak, diputuskan bahawa ia masih terletak di bawah bidangkuasa mahkamah sivil untuk memutuskanya jika anak masih di bawah umur. Meskipun pada ketika kes ini diputuskan artikel 121(1A) telahpun dipinda tetapi peruntukan ini tidak menghalang mahkamah sivil daripada menjalankan kuasanya apabila salah satu pihak yang terlibat dalam pertikaian dalam perbicaraan mahkamah syariah adalah bukan Islam. Oleh itu, bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah hanyalah terhad kepada penyelesaian kes di sesama orang Islam sahaja dan masyarakat yang bukan Islam masih tertakluk kepada bidangkuasa mahkamah sivil.

Rujuk kes-kes lain seperti Dalip Kaur v Pegawai polis Daerah (Balai Polis Bukit Mertajam) dan Shahamin Faizul Kung B. Abdullah v Asma’ Bt. Hj. Junus untuk mendapatkan gambaran yang lebih jelas tentang pertindihan kuasa yang amat ketara oleh mahkamah syariah dan sivil walaupun selepas pindaan artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Di samping, pertindihan kes-kes dan keputusan-keputusan antara mahkamah sivil dan syariah; terdapat juga beberapa statut yang boleh menyebabkan konflik bidangkuasa antara mahkamah sivil dan syariah. Meskipun, bagi tujuan merealisasikan kuasa mahkamah syariah sebagaimana dalam peruntukan perkara 121(1A) perlembagaan persekutuan, Kanun Tanah Negara telah dipinda dengan memasukkan satu seksyen baru iaitu seksyen 421A yang memberikan tafsiran perkataan mahkamah untuk maksud seksyen 417 dan 420 adalah termasuk mahkamah syariah.

Walaubagaimanapun terdapat beberapa statut lain yang perlu diselaraskan supaya memenuhi pindaan artikel 121(1A). Contohnya Akta mahkamah kehakiman 1964 yang mana seksyen 4 akta memperuntukan bahawa jika terdapat pertentangan atau percanggahan antara Akta mahkamah kehakiman 1964 dengan mana-mana undang-undang bertulis yang lain kecuali perlembagaan persekutuan yang berkuatkuasa pada tarikh kuatkuasa akta itu maka, peruntukan akta ini hendaklah mengatasi undang-undang itu. Seksyen ini seharusnya di mansuhkan memandangkan akta ini tidak mengiktiraf undang-undang bertulis yang lain termasuk undang-undang syariah yang jika bercanggah undang-undang sivil mengatasi peruntukan undang-undang syariah.

Mengikut seksyen 100 dan 112 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang masing-masing berkenaan dengan tafsiran wasiat dan kesahtarafan perlu dipinda serta tidak wajar dikenakan ke atas masyarakat Islam. Ini kerana mereka sudah mempunyai undang-undang Islam tentang hal-hal kekeluargaan yang termasuk pembahagian wasiat, kesahtarafan dan sebagainya.

Akta Penjagaan Kanak-Kanak 1961 ini hendaklah tidak terpakai di mana-mana negeri kerana peruntukan telah di buat untuk hak penjagaan kanak-kanak termasuk kanak-kanak Islam. Hak penjagaan kanak-kanak Islam sebenarnya di tadbirkan oleh kerajaan negeri masing-masing di Malaysia di bawah enakmen undang-undang keluarga Islam.

Akta pemegang Amanah 1949; perkataan wakaf hendaklah tidak termasuk dalam takrif ‘trust’ atau ‘amanah’ di bawah akta ini kerana seperti sedia maklum orang-orang Islam ditadbir oleh undang-undang Islam yang berlainan mengikut negeri masing-masing dan tidak wajar jika takrifan bagi sebarang peruntukan yang melibatkan orang-orang Islam akan mendorong Mahkamah sivil campurtangan dalam urusan hal ehwal tuntutan orang-orang Islam.

Jelaslah bahawa walaupun pindaan perlembagaan telah memberikan mahkamah syariah kuasa mutlak dalam perkara-perkara yang terletak di bawah bidang kuasanya; namun masih lagi boleh berlaku situasi yang mana orang Islam memohon kepada mahkamah tinggi melalui pengisytiharaan mahkamah yang menyatakan bahawa dia telah keluar daripada Islam, sedangkan kuasa menentukan murtad ataupun tidak oleh seseorang adalah dibawah bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah. Setelah diputuskan bahawa dia murtad, maka barulah pihak Majlis Agama Islam akan mengeluarkan Sijil Murtad kepada orang yang berkenaan. Hanya terdapat satu kemungkinan yang mana membolehkan mahkamah tinggi campurtangan dalam urusan mahkamah syariah iaitu apabila kuasa dan keputusan perbicaraan mahkamah syariah dipersoalkan oleh orang awam. Ini disebabkan mahkamah tinggi awam mempunyai bidangkuasa memeriksa semua keputusan yang melibatkan hak rakyat dalam negara. Pemeriksaan ini boleh dijalankan apabila tindakan yang dilakukan oleh sesuatu mahkamah itu bersifat ultra virus atau bercanggah dengan prinsip keadilan asasi.

Oleh yang demikian, ternyata sekali bahawa pindaan artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan memang sesuatu yang dialu-alukan tetapi langkah susulan yang wajar dan lebih praktikel perlu diambil supaya undang-undang yang diaplikasikan memenuhi tuntutan orang awam/masyarakat. Di sini penyeragaman undang-undang Islam perlu bagi menyelaraskan undang-undang Islam yang terpisah mengikut sentimen kenegerian dan seterusnya, Akta Induk undang-undang Islam harus digubal dan diwartakan agar mana-mana undang-undang tidak bercanggah dengan statut dan perlembagaan disamping mencerminkan bidangkuasa mahkamah syariah dan sivil yang lebih jelas, nyata serta mantap.

LABOUR LAW:CASE STUDY ON EMPLOYEE'S DISMISSAL

FACTS IN BRIEF
R RAMA CHANDRAN V THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF MALAYSIA & ANOR [1997] 1 MLJ 145
This was an appeal case tried in Federal Court of Malaysia. The appellant in this case R Rama Chandran an Employee was dismissed by the second respondent, the Malaysian Co-operative Consumer Society Ltd in the capacity as an Employer after two years of employment.

The Employee made a representation to the Director General for Industrial Relations under Section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 [hereinafter referred as the Act] claiming that he was dismissed by the Employer without just cause or excuse and asking that he must be reinstated to his former post, failing which he should be entitled to reasonable compensation for loss of earnings and loss of substantial gratuity, higher rates of the Employees’ Provident Fund [EPF], deprivation of housing loan and other benefits. His representation was referred to the Industrial Court, which subsequently held that the Employee was dismissed with just cause or excuse.

Later the Employee applied to the High Court for Judicial Review on various grounds appearing in his affidavit in support, which appear sufficiently in the judgments of the Federal Court but his application was dismissed. The Employee then appealed to the Federal Court against the decision of the High Court.

Broadly stated, the questions of law for the determination of the Federal Court were:-
  1. Whether the Award of the Industrial Court should be quashed; and
  2. If so, whether in the particular circumstances of this case the Federal Court had the power not merely to quash the Award of the Industrial Court and remit the case to the Industrial Court to hear and determine the same according to law, but to go further and itself find that the Employee had been dismissed from service without just cause or excuse, and to award fair compensation.
THE CIRCULATION OF QUESTION IN THE CASE OF
R RAMA CHANDRAN V THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF MALAYSIA & ANOR [1997] 1 MLJ 145
The question arise in this case was in regard with Labour Law. An Employee under an employment terminated his Employment by way of dismissal by an Employer. Now the Employee; R Rama Chandran claimed for wrongful or unlawful dismissal and relief by reason of failure of Industrial Court to consider allegations of biasness and victimization raised by him. Therefore, serious error of fact and law affect its jurisdiction. The issues that courts should determine is whether:-

(i) The dismissal was wrongful and without just cause or excuse; and
(ii) Award of the Industrial Court should be quashed

FEDERAL COURT’S VERDICT

Allowing the Employee’s appeal, the presiding judges in this case came up with certain view for their judgments which as follows:-
  1. Reasons given for the termination of the Employee’s services in the Employer’s letter dated 20 April 1988 were not genuine and that the purported termination was mala fide and the Industrial Court in its Award did not at all address its mind to the issue of bias raised by the Employee which, in the Court’s view, was the central pillar of his case. The failure of the Industrial Court to address its mind to this fundamental issue was a serious error which affected jurisdiction and which resulted in the Award being quashed.
  2. The Industrial Court must scrutinize the pleadings and identify the issues, note evidence, hear the parties arguments and finally pronounce its judgment having strict regard to the issues. However, in this case, the Industrial Court had totally failed to consider the allegations of misconduct but simply concluded that because the letter of termination was grounded on retrenchment exercise, it was not bound and therefore not obliged to consider the issues of bias and misconduct.
  3. For question whether superior court can make a decision while quashing a decision of inferior court; there is no provision in the Courts of Judicature Act 196 and the Rules of the High Court 1980 or the Act expressly or impliedly prohibiting the High Court from granting any relief as provided for in the Act when quashing an Award of the Industrial Court. The court cannot override an express provision of the law, but if there is no express provision in the statute, then the court can exercise its powers in a suitable.
  4. A decision susceptible to Judicial Review is not only open to challenge on the ground of procedural impropriety but also on the grounds of illegality and irrationality; and in practice, this permits the Court to scrutinize such decisions not only for process but also for substance.
  5. On the question whether the extent of the Court’s powers in review jurisdiction includes the power to make consequential orders or releif for fair compensation in favour of the Employee, instead of remitting the case to the Industrial Court to make the same according to law, the members of this Court who comprised the majority were of the view that the entire material evidence for the purpose of assessing the monetary compensation payable being before them, all that was required was a simple arithmetical calculation, a task which this Court should perform.
  6. Section 30(3) of the Act requires the Industrial Court to make its Award without delay and where practicable within 30 days. Here, the Employee had been without a job for seven years, and the object and spirit of the Act to have industrial disputes speedily resolved in the national interests had been defeated and frustrated. The courts, therefore, should not be obliged to continue to arrive at decisions which are both unjust to the citizens and inimical to the public well-being simply because of something decided centuries ago.
  7. Finally, based on the facts on record, this was a fit and proper case where the jurisdiction of the Court should not end with the quashing of the Award. The High Court jurisdiction should not be curtailed or narrowed or constricted by mere reference to the old historical development in which the writ of certiorari was developed and came to be granted by the courts in England. If the application for certiorari is dismissed, that ends the matter. But if the application is allowed, the Court has surely to mould the order. If it were to merely grant certiorari to quash the Award and nothing more, this would deprive the writ of its vital and effective meaning and may result in grave injustice being caused to the Employee.
SIGNIFICANT OF THIS CASE TO LABOUR LAW
The most significant of the case R Rama Chandran V The Industrial Court Of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 is that there appears to be a fear among some unions and workers generally [with the speed with which judicial review is affecting employment laws] that the superior courts may become too legalistic in exercising its supervisory role as the Judges may be remote from the everyday workings of the industrial relations and its problems unlike the Industrial Court specially constituted to deal with these on a daily basis in the course of its adjudication of disputes.

In the final analysis at least three [3] questions arise out of the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Courts. They are as follows:-
  1. Do they result in decisions that are too legalistic and complex and thereby limit the expansion and application of the scope of social justice?
  2. Does it allow inferior Tribunals like the Industrial Court to play its role in fulfilling the purpose to which it was set up?
  3. Do the review courts take into consideration or have the feel for socio-economic realities?
In Malaysia, our Constitution is based firmly on the separation of powers. Parliament makes the laws and the Judiciary interprets them. The Judiciary also develops the common law. Parliament confers all manner of powers on the Executive and other bodies. It is for the courts to ensure that those powers are neither exceeded nor abused but exercised lawfully. Hence the power of judicial review conferred on the courts.

The development of the law of judicial review and hence its scope depends very much on the extent to which the superior courts are prepared to take it to. Recently, the courts have been more active in enlarging the scope of the review process.

Previously a review could end with the quashing of a decision and/or an Order of Mandamus directing the inferior court to do something. However, in the recent case of R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 the Federal Court, after reviewing an Award of the Industrial Court for substance as well as the process, went further than the traditional method of granting relief. After quashing the Award of the Industrial Court the Federal Court itself proceeded to mould the relief that could be granted by the Industrial Court.

In the past the court would have remitted the case back to the Industrial Court for it to decide and grant any relief required. Thereafter, in several cases the superior courts in review proceedings after quashing a decision went on to determine and grant the relief instead of remitting the case back to the Industrial Court.

However, more recently there appears to be a reversal of this policy. A case in point is Koperasi Serbaguna Sanya Bhd (Sabah) v. Dr James Alfred (Sabah) & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 87 (CA); Federal Court [2001] 3 MLJ 529 (FC). In this regard the scope of Judicial Review appears to be fluid and fluctuating.

The scope and extent of judicial review has, I think, been stated by the Federal Court in the landmark case of R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145. The views expressed therein have been accepted and adopted by the Malaysian Judiciary at the highest level. Indeed, in the recent case of Petroleum Nasional Bhd v. Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2002] 2 MLJ 288.

Through my observation it’s quite clearly, the views expressed by the majority in R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 are not the product of what some legal commentators described as “Judicial Excessive”. On the contrary, they reflect the kind of controlled judicial activism that is needed in order to meet, in a supervisory context, the ever-widening powers conferred upon statutory tribunals or other bodies which have proliferated in modern times and affecting, quite conceivably, and all facets of society.

It has to be noted that in judicial review, the court does not substitute its opinion for that of the decision-maker on whom Parliament has conferred the power of decision. The court rules only on the legality of a decision - not on its correctness. In so doing, the court is not acting against the will of Parliament but in support of it. That is how it should be. In my view, by imposing requirements of fairness and rationality on public decision-makers, judicial review ensures that individuals are not subjected to arbitrary treatment by those entrusted with governmental power.

Friday, April 4, 2008

REEXAMINATION

REEXAMINATION


MEANING OF REEXAMINATION

Reexamination is used to provide a reevaluation of an issued matter based on prior questions of arts which are not considered by the examiner in the initial question issuance which will not only repair and restore but also to secure a repetition of the most important points of evidence tendered before the court of law.

THE PURPOSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

However, the object of reexamination goes beyond explanation. The aim of the re examiner is to explain, to complete any matter left incomplete and to countervail the damaging effect of the cross examination. In the picturesque phrase of Sir Frank Lockwood, which appears in almost every book on advocacy, where it says that “re examination-the putting Humpty-Dumpty together again was by no means an important portion of an advocate’s duty. Once, in the Court of Chancery, a witness was asked in cross-examination by an eminent Chancery leader whether it was true that he had been convicted of perjury. The witness owned the soft impeachment, and the cross examining counsel very properly sat down. Then it becomes the duty of an equally eminent Chancery QC to reexamine: ‘Yes’ said he, ‘it is true you have been convicted of perjury. But tell me: have you not on many other occasions been accused of perjury and been acquitted?’ he recommended that as an example of the way in which it ought not to be done”. This means the great reason for re examination is to prevent the garbling of the evidence that can always be ingeniously done by a skilful cross examination. The scope for real restoration is very narrow, not least because re examining counsel cannot lead. This means you must be able to frame non leading questions which take you to the point quickly, simply and effectively at the same time, the lawyer must frame them in a way that does not further confuse the witness. For this reason many questions in re examination are long winded or introduced by a lengthy preamble, and to attempt in addition, to re establish a witness credit, is unrealistic. According to W.A. Wells, former Justice Of the South Australian Supreme Court and writer of one of the leading judgments on re examination, notes that ‘some of the most effective. Even dramatic work in advocacy is done in re examination, where he stated that, “reexamination in practice is exciting where it calls for rapid and precise thought and a careful choice of language. A well entrenched rule of practice forbids the use of leading questions in reexamination; but reexamination will prove abortive unless the witness’s mind is clearly directed, not only to a specific topic, but also to the facet of the topic under scrutiny upon which, in the judgment of reexamination counsel further testimony should in justice, be given by the witness. In short, the questions must show the witness what the purpose of the reexamination is, without improperly leading him to the answer sought. Besides that, some junior counsel, in their way of anxiety to avoid an injustice, or indignant at the possible misuse of the witness’s answer, stumble into asking a leading question, to which the opposing counsel immediately and vociferously objects. It is imperative that re examination proceed smoothly; the last thing you want to happen is for the witness to be rattled by a dispute between counsels”.

In the case of The Nominal Defendant v Clements, the court decided re examination is designed to rebut the suggestion of recent invention or reconstruction, applies generally, to re examine all kind of evidence. Then, in the case of R v Szach (1980), the court held that re examination arise out of the cross-examination. If in the judgment of the trial judge, this condition precedent is not satisfied, the question sought to be asked can be asked only by leave. Reexamination is within its proper limits of that right and the occasion of its exercise are subject to the close scrutiny of the trial judge, who carries a heavy responsibility. Apart from that the purpose of the reexamination also described as the available material as to a relevant event has emerged from the cross-examination and then a lawyer may reexamine to put the whole into perspective where damaging evidence has been elicited or insinuated in cross-examination and there are facts which explain or amplify, reexamination is useful. It is absolutely necessary, in many cases to give a witness an opportunity after cross-examination of explaining any statements inadvertently made during cross examination. In order to determine whether to reexamine, you need first of all to know the case, and then you must be able to recognize the damage or potential damage caused to your case by cross-examination. The other pre-condition is that you must have the material to repair the damage. If you have that material, you may reexamine and if you don’t have it, you must not. A good reexamination will not only repair and restore, but will also secure a repetition of the most important points of evidence and so imprint it more firmly. Besides that, some counsel are very conservative about reexamination and will only attempt it when certain witness has the right answers. There are others who are more adventurous, and will re examine on the basis that they believe [from pre-trial preparation and analysis] that the witness will produce the right explanation.

Basically, there are three steps in performing a good reexamination, that is:-

  1. Giving a clear and direct signpost to the witness about to be re examine in a non contentious way
  2. The lawyers are entitle to direct the witness to a particular topic
  3. Bring the witness to the critical point, where there must be careful frame of non leading question which will obtain the explanation, or omitted feature.

A reexamination must be prepared “on the run”. Preparation for its partly to be found in the witness proof of evidence as this will usually contain the additional explanatory material which you will use to repair the damage. The rest of your preparation must be done while the cross-examination is taking place. During cross-examination, keep a separate note of the points for reexamination and the question that is wished to ask. In particular watch the witness to see if there are any answer in cross-examination which a lawyer wishes to explain or add something to which may modify their effect, and make a note accordingly. In extreme cases, you may seek an adjournment for a conference at the end of cross-examination before re examining, but that is an indulgence infrequently granted. In any event, in a jury matter it may well be a tactical error, for although it gives the witness a chance to collect his thoughts, and the lawyer a chance to take instructions, it carries the appearance of both collusion and consternation. Furthermore, the tactics acquired in a reexamination are, if the evidence given by the witness has not been shaken by cross-examination and there is nothing to be explained, or nothing omitted from the evidence in chief that has arisen in cross-examination, do not reexamine, but let the witness go. This is because, if you take the risk and reexamine the witness intending to help you, this can bring the chances to ask a mistake question that will discredit the credibility of the witness. So, the safe rule is don’t mend holes, because reexamine is only about important matters. If the witness is completely destroyed by cross-examination as to his credit, and is enveloped in hopeless contradictions, the only thing to do is not to reexamine. If the attack on the credit is damaging but not altogether destructive, an opportunity to explain is desirable and will likely find the jury sympathetic to the witness. So, as a matter of good advocacy, the right of reexamination should be exercised circumspectly and confined to matter of substance. A failed attempt at reexamination will considerably reinforce the point scored by your opponent; correspondingly a successful reexamination has the twin advantage of restoring witnesses and thus enhancing credit and making your opponent look foolish. In reexamination also, lawyers cannot attempt to improve on favorable answers and do not attempt to reconcile contradictory answers unless you are sure of the outcome because a third version might be the result.

As a conclusion, reexamination is described as the right given to lawyers to re examine only when there has been cross-examination, and must be confined to explanation of matters which properly arise from that cross-examination. This stage of reexamine also to explain and, complete any matter left incomplete and to countervail the damaging effect of the cross-examination.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

CROSS-EXAMINATION

MEANING OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

In trials, each party calls witnesses. Each party may also question the other's witness(es). When you ask questions of the other party's witness(es), it is called a "cross-examination" and you are allowed considerably more latitude in cross-examination then when you question your own witnesses (called an "examination-in-chief"). For example, you are not allowed to ask leading questions to your own witness whereas you can in cross-examination.

THE PURPOSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

Cross-examine is an element that provides an unequalled opportunity to lose it, where as general rule stated that there must be a very good reason for asking each and every question. The way to decide whether a cross examine at all to isolate the reasons for asking each question, and weigh the likely gain against the risk. If there is any substantial risk, the better course is almost always don’t. Where there is any risk at all, be as brief as possible. The reason to challenge the evidence or the witness will have been demonstrated and exposed by the case analysis. The necessity of cross examination will be revealed by testing that reason against the aims of cross examination. The risk must then be weighed against the aim sought and the probable gain to be achieved. Next, the aims of cross examination are not the discovery of new facts or of truth. Neither is it for testing a rope of evidence inch by inch and strand by strand. This can be referred in a book written by Harris entitle of Hints on Advocacy, that says “it should be borne in mind that the objects of cross examination are three, the first positive, and the other two negative. They are to obtain evidence favorable to the client to weaken evidence that has been given against your client and finally if nothing of value which is favorable can be obtained to weaken or destroy the value of the evidence by attacking the credibility of the witness”.

Morris, in the Technique of Litigation describes the objectives of cross examination are as follows:-

a. To elicit facts favorable to your case.
b. To elicit facts that may be used to cross examine other witnesses.
c. To show that adverse evidence is unacceptable
d. To show that the witness himself is not worthy of credence.
e. To put your case to the witness so that it may be known and commented upon

Next, the aims of cross examine also explained by Munkman in Technique of Advocacy, which refers to four specific aspects:-

  1. To destroy the material parts of the evidence in chief
  2. To weaken the evidence where it cannot be destroyed
  3. To elicit new evidence, helpful to the party cross examining
  4. To undermine the witness or shake his credit, as it is commonly expressed by showing that he cannot be trusted to speak the truth, or that he is deposing [however honestly] to matters of which he has no real knowledge.

As for Wrottsley, he stated that “the objects of cross examination are three in number. The first is to elicit something in your favor; the second is to weaken the force of what the witness has said against you; and the third is to show that from his present demeanor or from his past life he is unworthy of belief, and thus weaken or destroy the force of his testimony”. So, ultimately the entire version comes down that as witness being cross examined is concerned, there are two principal aims only that is, extract any benefit you can and destroy, undermine or explain everything else. Second, if you are defending, it is the first opportunity; you have of getting the case for the defence before the tribunal. Apart from that, the main purpose of cross examination also can be stated to elicit material favorable to your case, yet advocates continue to perceive cross examination as exclusively attacking or confrontational. In truth, this technique while less spectacular than attack is more readily achievable and much more frequently successful. The stage of cross examine is also entitled to explain ambiguities and to put evidence in its proper and complete context in much the same way as may be done in re examination. Where if an evidence has been led of a fact, circumstance or event which is incomplete or which may mislead the tribunal of fact, effective cross examine may involve completing the picture favorably to the cross examiner’s case. This is better done by short, courteous propositions without challenging the witness, than by confrontation. In this stage also, any answer given by a witness about collateral facts are said to be final. This means that, although they may be pursued by further questioning and may indeed be disbelieved by the fact finder, they cannot be contradicted by the cross examiner calling other evidence for that purpose. A witness may of course be contradicted on matters relevant to the issue. This also had been quoted by Pollock CB in the case of Attorney General v Hitchcock, where “if the answer of a witness is a matter which you would be allowed on your part to prove in evidence-if it have such a connection with the issue, that you would be allowed to give it in evidence-then it is a matter on which you may contradict him”. Furthermore, there are also general duty or ethical restrictions imposed in conducting cross examination, where it includes a framework that a duty to not cross examine so as to serious misconduct, criminality or fraud, unless the practitioner has both a proper and reasonable basis for the allegation and the suggestion if it goes to a fact in issue will, if accepted by the witness, materially diminish the witness’s credibility.

The general techniques in a cross examine no less than in examination in chief where witnesses are entitled to be treated fairly. This means courtesy and respect, or calm and courteous approach to cross examine. In the stage of cross examine, clarity is an important element, where a witness must understand what you are asking him. This is because if your question is clear and precise, the answer will be recorded in an understandable way and there will be no doubts as to what it was and you will be able to use it unchallenged and unambiguous in your address. Next, there must be element of courtesy, where a quiet manner and remaining in control is the essence of the advocate where the only person who suffers when you lose your self control, and do not show courtesy to the court and to your witness, is the lawyer, itself. Then in this stage also we need the aspect of content, where a lawyer should not ever cross examine unless the cross examination is likely to advance your case. Cross examining on trial on irrelevant matters is more likely to damage your case and is fruitless. Besides that, if you cross examine on trivialities rather than focusing on important defects in the evidence, you risk lowering the tribunal’s index of suspicion about the reliability of the witness, rather than enhancing your prospect of successful impeachment of the witness, and this particularly important when cross examining on prior inconsistent statements.

A cross-examination is an ordered and planned. This means, the procedure of the cross examine must be followed accurately, where it must be started by affirming or repeating the favorable material which was elicited in chief. Indeed, the stage must be begin by asking about non contentious matters to establish a friendly atmosphere with the witness. After that, must proceed to the omitted topics and complete those favorable to your case. At this stage, the cross examination must be constructive; using the witness to complete the picture to the extent it favors your case. This conforms to the general aims of cross examination, that is get what you can and destroy the rest. The next stage is to reveal the apparently hostile evidence of the witness in the way explaining by context or alternative explanations. Before going to either the misleading context or the other explanations, the lawyers need to extract the incontrovertible established facts or the facts confident to be established, later. Then if the witness agrees, the stage will go on compelling agreement to the proper context or alternative connotation. If the witness does not agree, provable facts will be later spoken for themselves. This is the part the stage of cross examine will change its character from constructive to destructive. Finally, there will be challenge to the witness in a destructive cross examination, and the witness will be attacked with all sorts of materials until the tribunal believes that the weakness of the witness are already exposed and not worthy to be believed anymore.

So, this means a cross examination determines to destroy the material parts of the evidence in chief and to weaken the evidence where it cannot be destroyed, or in other words, the stage of cross examination is to obtain evidence favorable to the client to squash the evidence that has been given against the client in a case and finally if nothing of value which is favorable, this stage also can be used to weaken or destroy the value of the evidence, by attacking the credibility of the witness in the case.

At the conclusion or end of the cross-examination of a witness, the party who has called him is permitted to re examine to explain any part of the cross examination which has proved unfavorable. According to Phipson on Evidence, this explanation extends to explaining motives for a prior inconsistent statement and to re examination on inadmissible matter which was introduced in cross examination, but there are conflicting authorities cited. The right to re examine exists only when there has been cross examination, and must be confined to explanation of matters which properly arise from that cross examination, unless the judge gives leave to the contrary. This can be referred to the case of The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Brod & ER 976, and Section 39 Uniform Evidence Acts, that it should be noted that, at common law the rule does not forbid re examination on parts of a statement necessary to explain other parts elicited in cross examination, so as to put them in proper context, or to elicit the whole statement on the relevant subject, as was said in the Queen’s Case, “not only so much as may explain or qualify the matter introduced by the previous examination, but, even the matter not properly connected with the part introduced upon the previous examination, provided only, that it relate to the subject matter of the suit; because it would not be just to take part of a conversation as evidence against a party, without giving to the party, at the same time, the benefit of the entire residue of what he said on the same occasion”. The rule in The Queen’s Case can make a whole document admissible although it was not admissible in chief. In this way, re examination can become the vehicle for the introduction of new and important evidence. This advantage is attended by a concomitant disadvantage-that re examination is subject to the same rules as examination in chief, including the prohibition on leading questions. The task is made doubly hard because it comes at a time when the witness has been unsettled by cross examination.

So an Effective cross-examination is organized and concise. Jurors are able to follow the direction of the cross-examiner, understanding the important points at the time when they are being made. The witness is kept under control by the examiner through the questions asked and the examiner's treatment of non responsive answers. Finally, the effective cross-examiner takes advantage of those opportunities available in the situation that can decrease the witness's credibility in the eyes of jurors and/or further reveal favorable information about one's case.

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF

MEANING OF EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF

The questioning of own witness under oath. Witnesses are introduced to a trial by their examination-in-chief, which is when they answer questions asked by the lawyer representing the party which called them to the stand. After their examination-in-chief, the other party's lawyer can question them too; this is called "cross-examination".

THE PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF

Examination-in-chief is the one of the most difficult and most under estimated of all the advocate’s tasks. The general view stated about examination in chief is this element is an easy task that anyone can undertake and demands neither ability nor experience. The aim of examination in chief or direct testimony is to adduce the whole of the material that witnesses can proffer about the case which is relevant and material. Besides that, the element of cross examination is also to test or attack that evidence, to correct error and supply omission and the object of re-examination is to explain, rectify and to put in order. The importance of this examination in chief also can be seen in the time where little time is commonly given when preparing for a trial and there must be a requirement where a correct method of examining witnesses in chief is of vital importance to the proper and effective conduct of case. Apart from that, any error or inability to elicit the necessary evidence has more irreversible consequences that failure in cross examination, because the witnesses evidence in chief is that upon which is so much usually depends. So, this means in examination in chief it required skill in adducing evidence. This can also be referred from the book entitle of Winning Strategies and Technique for Civil Litigation, written by JE Lyons, “where the trial lawyers greatest opportunity to hammer the facts to the jury comes during direct examination. It is then that the trial lawyer will have the greatest control of the organization and pace of the interrogation and it is then he should be confident of what the answer will be.” Next, the examination in chief also play a central role where it will present the evidence in a complete and convincing form and the evidence in chief is therefore the pivot of the whole case.

The scope of the examination in chief is to elicit from the witness a complete orderly story told by the witness in his own natural way, with the minimum of prompting. The story should be in the in the right order, usually the order of time. If there are several distinct topics and they should be introduced one by one according to their importance, where each topic being exhausted before turning to the next aspect of the story. Besides that, the story also should be complete in detail, but this does not mean that it is necessary to go into minute details which have no substantial relevance and then the selection may be necessary. The examination in chief also will have its own strategic plan and the witness will provide the lawyers with the tactical means of achieving any lawyer’s responsible objective. This element also states that there must be a definite object in mind when asking a question. This means the objective in raising a question cannot be confusing or side tracked. In examination in chief, it is safe to not ask a question unless there is a good reason to believe the answer will be favorable. The examination and the individual question alike should be as short as the case permits. This is because any non essential materials in chief will only serves only to present your opponent with more material on which to cross examine. It is enough for the witness to be cross examined about the issue and it is pure folly to provide the opponent with irrelevant material to use for counter attack. Apart from that, in examination in chief, there are certain aspects to be followed such as the witness preparation, where to succeed in any case, one needs sound preparation based on detailed knowledge and understanding of the case. This means, the witness must be instructed about the examination in chief that their answer must be short and no additional answer to the question asked. Next, the witness in a in chief stage, must listen to the question and answer it. if a completely truthful answer can be given by ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember’, that should be the answer made. The third aspect is the witness must be advised to not to guess an answer and do not reconstruct. The witness should be given hypothetical examples of the pitfalls that attend failure to follow these rules. Furthermore, there are also the tactical decisions, where, the case theory will have established the narrative or story, it is intended to present and ultimately prove. The brief or file and subsequent conferences will have identified that witnesses are available. The tactical question who to call then arises.

Decisions must be made whether all or some only of the available witnesses are to be called and whether there are sound reasons to exclude any particular witness. In this stage also, in the aspect of proving a prima facie case, the examination in chief plays a prominent role where according to Wrottesley, in the book entitle, Principles of Advocacy, “it becomes necessary sometimes for the plaintiff only to put in enough of his evidence to make out a prima facie case, and it is occasionally best to keep back the strongest testimony until the testimony of his opponent has been heard, and then offered by the way of rebuttal to the case which is being made against him. After the jurors have heard the testimony for the defence, they are better prepared than they were before to appreciate the remaining testimony of the plaintiff”. Then, examination-in-chief also gives importance to the order of the witnesses, where it is strictly advisable to put your best witness first in the in chief stage, that is relevant with the aim of the examination in chief that, to prove the witness the various elements of the case. Besides that, we also can see the rational of the usage of examination-in-chief, where it is based on the rule that the lawyer/advocate may not be the witness because they are not competent to take the oath, nor present at any relevant stage of the vents to be related. In examination in chief also, stated that it is wiser and safer to obtain evidence which could on any view be contentious by the use of non leading questions and it is customary for the witness to be led only until the matter in issue is reached. This has been quoted by R v Thynne [1977], where it said “the prohibition of leading questions in examination-in-chief is intended to prevent the examination from being conducted unfairly. There is a risk that a witness who is asked a leading question may assent to the suggestion made to him instead of answering from his own memory”. The techniques used in an examination-in-chief, as been explained in Cross on Evidence [Aus Ed], where “it may be noted that the evidence of witness in chief is elicited by means of question and answers, not by the delivery of the speech. The purpose of examination in chief is to enable the party who has called a witness to put his evidence before the court; the method adopted being that of oral question and answer. This is a characteristic feature of the English trial which is made essential by the exclusionary rules of evidence. If a witness were allowed to say what he wished, as in the continental practice, a rule such as the exclusion of hearsay would be Impossible to operate. The question and answer method gives counsel control of what the witness says, which makes for order and relevance but places upon counsel a considerable responsibility to present the evidence in a fair and complete manner”. There is also general technique in the stage of in chief, where it consists of first the manner. This means, must be polite and firm when having concluded the opening speech and gained the attention on the way of introduction and reception of your evidence in chief. This behavior is important because, it will bring a pleasant and polite manner that will ensure continued attention of the judge and the witness, therefore settling his nerves. Next, the lawyers have to remain good tempered, where if you never lose our temper and invariably treat all witness you examine with courtesy; you will obtain more favorable testimony than would be obtained. A lawyer in this stage also must remain in control, where you can obtain and retain control over the witness. The next element is the voice usage, where it must be a clear, distinct and interesting and can be understood by the witness and the tribunal, with good variation of pitch and tone effective to highlight certain aspects of the testimony. This follows with the command of language, where you must need a sufficient general knowledge to enable you to enliven and illustrate them without relying on the clichés. The other factors that follows are in conducting a examination in chief are form, pace, content, style, listening to the answers, and other relevant aspects.

So, this means in an examination in chief that rule of evidence that govern the rule of the in chief stage, summarized as, the witness must be competent and the evidence given must be relevant. Besides that, the witness and the evidence given also must be credible, admissible, must not be in a general rule as hearsay evidence. Next, it also must be the whiteness’s evidence that is must not be a leading question and the examiner must not impeach his own witness.

LAND LAW:PROPERTY CHARGE

AH SENG OWNS A BUNGALOW IN BANGI AND HE RENTED IT OUT TO ALI. IN 1995 AH SENG BORROWED RM200,000 FROM BERJASA BANK AND HE PUT THE BUNGALOW AS SECURITY. THE CHARGE WAS REGISTERED IN DECEMBER 1995. IN OCTOBER 1996 BERJASA BANK INFORMED AH SENG THAT HIS LOAN REPAYMENTS IS OVER DUE FOR SIX MONTHS AND THE BANK IS NOT HAPPY WITH IT. AT THAT TIME AH SENG WAS EXPERIENCING SOME GREAT FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND UNTIL TODAY HE DID NOTHING TO SATISFY BERJASA BANK’S DEMAND. ADVISE THE PARTIES.

The Issues arises in this case whereby Ah Seng the owner of a bungalow had borrowed RM RM200,000 from a finance institution which known as Berjasa Bank by charged his bungalow as a security. The charged registered on 1995 and on 1996 the bank seeks for recover the amount borrowed to Ah Seng due to the default in the loan repayment for six (6) months. So now the question, whether bank can bring an action to recover the money borrowed? If yes what are the legal remedies provided and available for the bank to proceed further under Malaysian National Land Code 1965.

According to National Land Code 1965, section 241(1) cited the power of charging the whole, but not a part only of any alienated land; of any undivided share in alienated land and any lease of alienated land may be charged with the repayment of any debt, or the repayment of any sum other than a debt or the payment of any annuity or other periodic sum.

In the context of this case its obvious that Ah Seng is a chargor has charged his land to Berjasa Bank which ia a chargee as a security for the loan that he have borrowed from the bank. A charged is created over the whole bungalow not a part only, of any alienated land or lease thereof or undivided share to secure the repayment of any debt or the payment of any sum. It is as a security transaction under the National Land Code 1965 only upon registration so as to render the land as security for the loan or sums of money advanced.

Under section 243 of National Land Code 1965 the land/bungalow to be liable or to make effect the charges as a security needs registration and the fact of this case show that the charges between Ah Seng and Bank are a security transaction which comply with the National Land Code 1965 upon registration so as to render the land as security for the loan or sums of money advanced or borrowed to Ah Seng.

By virtue of section 249 (1) (a) of National Land Code stated about agreements by implied in all charges. Every charge that created under this act there shall be implied on the part of the charger. An agreement that he will comply with the provisions thereof as to payment of the sum thereby secured and with any provision for the payment of interest thereon if any in the terms are set out to be bind among them. Means that by section 249 (1) (a) of National Land Code, Ah Seng has to obey to the rules of repayment of the loan that he had borrowed from the chargee and he owed the responsibility for the loan repayment even though Ah Seng facing some great financial problem.

Therefore any breach of the condition of the contract or agreement will make chargor liable towards the chargee according to the National Land Code, and the chargee can apply for remedy either an order for sale or possession of the charged land as to recover the money borrowed.

Section 253 (1) of National Land Code conferred the power to enable any chargee to obtain the sale of the land or lease or to take possession of the land to which his charge relates in the event of a default, or breach committed by the chargor of any of the agreements on his part expressed or implied therein. According to this section, chargee has the authority to exercise remedy order for sale towards the property that is the bungalow house. However, before the remedy is grant to the chargee; the Berjasa Bank as chargee must served a notice to Ah Seng to inform and urge chargee to make repayment of loan.

The sufficient notice that should be served to Ah Seng must be in Form 16D; this according to section 254 (1) for the default of loan repayment done by chargee which amount to a breach of agreement as is mentioned through the section 253 (1). There under if at the expiry of the period specified in any such notice the breach in question has not been remedied the whole sum secured by the charge shall become due and payable to the chargee and the chargee may apply for an order sale accordance with section 254 (3).

So the chargee Bank Berjasa a Financial Institution can apply for an order for sale. This principle was supported by the decided case of Jacob v. Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, Ipoh where in the case an appellant had charged his land to the respondent bank to secure the repayment of an overdraft. The charge was recovering an overdraft of $ 6000 and for interest. On default of payment the respondent bank made a demand for payment by letter and subsequently served on the appellant a notice of default in the form of 16D prescribed that the National Land Code. The bank applied for an order that the land be sold by public auction and the application was allowed in the High Court. The appellant appealed and one of the grounds of appeal was that the notice should have been given in the form 16E.

However, the court held that where there was a demand for payment of principal and interest, Form 16E could be used as well as form 16D and the demand may be made by either form.

In additional, Bank Berjasa may recover the principal sum secured by any chargee with a special provision of section 255 (1) where the chargee may make the demand by a notice is Form 16E and in that event if the in question is not paid to him within one month of the date on which the notice is served may apply for an order for sale without being required to serve a notice in form 16D under section 254 (1).

This provision applied in the case of VAM Hussain v. BP Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. The fact of the case is an appellant a land owner of a piece of land and BP Malaysia Sdn Bhd thought it a good site for a filling and service station commonly known as petrol pump. The purchase price is $ 90,500. They also agreed to advance the appellant $ 45,000. To protect themselves BP had the land charged to them to secure repayment of $ 45,000. At the time of transaction BP entered written agreement with appellant. However the city government did not allow to built the petrol pup on that land. According to the agreement, if the plan disapproved all moneys paid by BP must be refunded. So BP sent a notice in Form 16E required under National Land Code to demand the payment of $ 45,000 within one month. Appellant did not comply the notice and BP took out the originating summons for an order that the land to be sold to satisfy the sum of $ 45,000 together with interest. BP won the order but appellant appeal further. However, the court had dismiss the appeal in this case as the principal sum secured by the charge was payable on demand, the respondent had used the correct form. The inclusion of interest in the form 16E did not make the notice defective.

Apart from that, there is an another option for the chargee Berjasa Bank to recover the loan borrowed to Ah Seng by apply for remedy of possession. Mean that the chargee can take possession of the property on the event of any default by chargor to settle the loan repayment which is authorized under section 271 of National Land Code 1965. Where the right to possession conferred under section 271 (1) so chargee may at any time when the chargor is in breach of any agreement on his part expressed or implied in the charge, enter into possession of the whole or any part of the charged land or as the case may be, the land comprised in the charged lease.

Section 272 (1) (a) & (b) described the procedures for taking possession by a chargee. A chargee intending to enter into possession of any land shall where he is to do so by receiving the rent payable to the chargor under any lease or tenancy serve a notice in Form 16J on the lessee or tenant, and a copy thereof on the chargor and where he is to do so by going into occupation, serve a notice in Form 16K on the chargor. Upon the service of a notice in Form 16J on any lessee or tenant, there shall pass to the chargee all the rights, powers and remedies of the chargor with respect to the receipt and recovery of, and the giving of discharges for, the rent in question including any amount due, but not paid, prior to the service of the notice. Where any chargor on whom a notice in Form 16J is served fails within the period specified in that behalf in the notice to admit, or secure the admission of, the chargee into occupation of the land in question, the chargee may apply to the court for possession in accordance with the provisions of any law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure.

Section 273 stipulated the duration of right to possession. A chargee who has entered into possession of any land without prejudice to his right to relinquish possession at any earlier time, remain in possession so long as the land continues subject to any liability under the charge. A chargee in possession of any land by occupation may remain in possession either by continuing in occupation or by exercising his power under section 275 to lease the land and receive the rent payable under the lease. A chargee in possession of any receipt of rent may, on the determination of the lease or tenancy under which the rent is payable, remain in possession either by receiving the rent payable under a new lease granted by him or by going into occupation, or partly in one way and partly in the other.

Besides that, in the part of Ali; Ali is a tenant who rented the bungalow from the owner of that property which is Ah Seng and paid rented for his tenancy payment. Meanwhile, the bungalow rented by Ali was registered as a security for the loan RM 200,000 which made by Ah Seng from Berjasa Bank. So the problem arise here through the default in repayment of laon over due for six months by Ah Seng amount Ali to suffer the difficulties too; whereby the chargee while take an action towards the charge property, which is the bungalow, Ali has to vacate the premises and he has no choice except to vacate if Berjasa Bank go for the remedy of order for sale. This is according to the provision of section 254 (2) National Land Code which cited that the notice served to the owner shall valid and effectual against the person who vests the interest in such charged land. However, further reasonable and sufficient notice should be furnished to Ali to vacate the premises that he rented besides to make the notice more effect.

Despite if the chargee applies for the remedy to take possession of the charged property Ali may have the option of having a tenancy rights over the house. But the rental payment will belong to the new owner that is the Berjasa Bank. As it was stated in section 271 (1) National Land Code, which means that if Berjasa Bank allows Ali to remain with his tenancy rights by allowing him to continue stay; then Ali ought to pay his tenancy and any sort of payment of the regard property to the Berjasa Bank, because the legal rights towards the payment of rental owned by the new owner until the end of the specified duration of the tenancy agreement between Ali and Berjasa Bank.

Even though Ali has to vacate the house; if an order for sale obtained by Berjasa Bank, but he still can claim the compensation from Ah Seng as a parties to the tenancy agreement; in the presumption that Ah Seng in the breach of tenancy agreement agreed between them for specified period, because Ah Seng had rented before the property was charged to Berjasa Bank.

Ah Seng as a owner of the charged property which is a bungalow house has right to tender the payment at any time before sale according to provision of section 266 National Land Code and the offer must be amount to the actual/physical tender which allowed in the case of The Chartered Bank v Packiri Maideen & Anor. Besides that Ah seng can bid for the charged property in the public auction. This principal was derived from the case of Malayan United Finance v Adsoni (M) Sdn Bhd.

As a conclusion, Berjasa Bank can apply for remedy under charge through legal proceedings either for an order for sale or take possession of such charged property. However, it is appropriate and advantage for Bank Berjasa to apply for the remedy by an order for sale to recover the default of loan repayment in lump sum within a short period of time frame.

PLEADINGS IN CIVIL COURT

Pleadings are statements in writing drawn up and filed by each party to an action stating what his contention will be at the trial and giving all such details as his opponents needs to know in order to prepare his case in answer. It is a cardinal rule that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed adduce facts which they had not pleaded. In the case of Blay v Pollard & Morris (1930) Scrutton LJ observed that “cases must be decided on the issues on the record; and if it is desired to raise other issues they may be placed on the record by amendment.

Some of the documents which comes within the definition of pleadings are statement of claim, defence, reply, counterclaim, defence of counterclaim, a statement of claim indorsed on a writ of summons, and further and better particulars of pleadings. Some of the documents, which fall outside the definition of pleadings, are a general indorsement on a writ, a petition, summons or preliminary act, an originating summons and any affidavit or notice of appeal. An affidavit may stand as a pleading if specifically ordered by the court. When further and better particulars are furnished it amounts to pleadings. The objects of pleadings are as follows: (a) to define with clarity and precision the issues in dispute, (b) to require each party to give fair and proper notice to his opponent, in order to enable him to prepare his case and (c) to inform the court the issues, which are, required to be determined by the court.

The importance of pleadings was emphasized by the Supreme Court in the case of Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd (1991). The court stated that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings it could not be allowed to be argued and to succeed on appeal. The rules regarding pleadings are set out under Order 18 of The Rules Of The High Court, 1980.

Under Order 18 of The High Court Rules it is stated that a pleading must state the facts and not the law. In the case of Song Lian Chye v Tai Kian Cheong (1983), the Federal Court stated that it is a cardinal rule of pleading that law should not be pleaded. Order 18 Rule 7 states that pleadings must only contain material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence. It must state only the facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. It also states that the facts must be in form of a concise statement, but in aiming at conciseness precision should not be sacrificed.

According to Order 18 Rule 6, the pleadings where necessary, shall be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively and each allegation being so far as is convenient contained in a separate paragraph. Dates, sums and figures shall be expressed in figures. It is also stated under Order 18 R 7(3) that allegation in anticipation of the opponent’s answer should not be made. The pleadings should be confined to what is material at the present stage of the action. Facts necessary for the enforcement of a legal right or duty must be mentioned. Thus in an action for breach of contract, it has to be stated specifically the terms of the contract and the breach thereof by the defendant.

According to Order 18 R 7(3), facts, which the law presumes in ones favour or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the opponent need not be pleaded. The party also should not plead conclusion of law. However foreign law and certain customs and usage which are not judicially taken notice by the court, must be pleaded as facts.

All pleadings must be filed in the registry of the High Court where the writ issued and served within the prescribed time as stated below, unless the court gives leave to the contrary. According to Order 18 R 1, a statement of claim must be filed and served with the writ unless there is a general indorsement or within fourteen days after the defendant has entered appearance. Under Order 18 R 2, a statement of defence must be filed and served within fourteen days after the time limited for the appearance, or after the statement of claim is served on him. If the plaintiff intends to serve a reply he must do so within fourteen days after the service of the defence. This can be found under Order 18 R 3(4). If the defendant serves a defence with a counterclaim, the plaintiff must serve a reply if any, within fourteen days after the service of defence. If there is a counterclaim, a defence to the counterclaim within fourteen days after the service of the defence and counterclaim. Generally both the reply and the defence to the to the counterclaim are joint and is served as one document. No pleading subsequent to a reply or a defence to a counterclaim can be served unless the court grants leave.

Generally parties are bound by their pleadings and they are not permitted to raise any issue at the trial if it is not pleaded. In the case of Mat bin Lim & Anor v Ho Yut Kam & Anor (1967), the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendant in their defence pleaded that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by limitation. In reply the plaintiff alleged there has been an acknowledgement of liability. The defendant applied for the plaintiff’s statement of claim to be struck out on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The court held that the acknowledgement should have been pleaded in the statement of claim and, as this was not done, the plaintiff’s statement of claim to be struck out must be allowed.

Pleadings are statements in writing prepared by the parties and served on each other. They consist of all the material facts on which the parties rely for the purpose of establishing a claim or defence. The pleading process only applies to an action commenced by writ. The term pleading is not positively defined by the rules but is expressed to exclude a petition, summons and preliminary act. An affidavit is not a pleading unless there is a specific order that it stands as one. Nor is a general endorsement on neither a writ, nor a notice of appeal a pleading. Pleadings include a statement of claim, a counterclaim, a defence and defence to counterclaim, a reply and subsequent responses served with the leave of court. When particulars of pleadings are given pursuant to a request or an order of court or voluntarily, they form part of the pleadings.

Every pleading must comply with the formal requirements laid down by the rules. These requirements ensure that the pleading is appropriately identified, that is it has the necessary details in relation to the suit, that the terminology used in respect of certain matters is consistent, that the content of the pleading is expressed in the appropriate form, and that it is properly endorsed and signed. Accordingly, every pleading must ‘bear on its face’ the year in which the writ in the action was issued and the number of action, the title of the action and the description of the pleading. The pleadings must, if necessary, be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, ‘each allegation being so far as convenient contained in a separate paragraph’. Dates, sums and other numbers must be expressed in figures and not in words. Where the party sues or defends in person, the pleading must be endorsed with his name and address. In any other case, it should be endorsed with the name of the firm and business address of the solicitor by whom it was served. The pleading must be signed by the party’s solicitor or by the party, if he sues or defends in person. Specific provisions as to the paper used for the court documents must be considered in relation to the pleadings.

According to Order 18 R 20, pleadings in an action is deemed to be closed at the expiration of fourteen days after the service of the defence. However if there is a reply or defence to counterclaim pleadings is deemed to be closed after fourteen days of the service of the reply or defence to the counterclaim. It also can be noted under Order 18 R 22 that either party may, after the defendant has entered appearance apply to the court for an order that the action be tried without pleadings or further pleading as the case may be. The court may make an order provided it is satisfied that the issues in dispute between the parties can be defined without pleadings or further pleadings.